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THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE
DOMESTIC DECISION ON PROSECUTIONS
FOR PAST TORTURE
Bartram S. Brown*
INTRODUCTION: U.S. TORTURE POLICY AT A CROSSROADS
The newly elected Obama Administration faced the difficult deci-
sion of whether to pursue the investigation and prosecution of torture
committed during the previous Administration. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency's (CIA) own internal review' has confirmed that be-
tween 2001 and 2003 the United States used shocking enhanced
interrogation techniques such as revving a power drill beside a naked
and hooded detainee,2 threatening to kill a detainee and his children,
3
and using an especially "poignant and convincing" form of water-
boarding.4 That internal review also makes it clear that use of these
enhanced interrogation techniques was authorized and approved both
by the CIA and by official legal opinions from the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ).5
Those legal opinions have been severely criticized as inconsistent with
the law and with standards of professional integrity,6 and even under
the Bush Administration, the OLC ultimately repudiated the worst of
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Program in International and Comparative Law, Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Member, American Law Institute;
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1. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INSPECTOR GENERAL, SPECIAL REVIEW: COUNTERTER-
RORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTrIVITIES (SEPT. 2001-OCT. 2003) (2003-7123-IG)
(2004), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20090825-DETAIN/200 4
CIAIG.pdf [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW].
2. Id. 92. Some of the other especially shocking interrogation techniques used by the
United States, according to the CIA Inspector General, included threats of execution, threats to
sexually abuse a detainee's female relatives in front of him, "buttstroking" with rifles, and knee
kicks to the torso. Id. 94, 169, 196.
3. Id. 95.
4. Id. 79.
5. Id. 16.
6. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to Be Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 158 (2005)
(statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Dean of Yale Law School) [hereinafter Koh Testimony] (re-
ferring to the Bybee Memorandum-which offered "a definition of torture that would have
exculpated Saddam Hussein"-as "perhaps the most clearly legally erroneous opinion I have
ever heard," and as "a stunning failure of lawyerly craft").
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them.7 But however flawed these official legal opinions may have
been, any attempt to prosecute CIA interrogators who relied upon
them would raise issues of fairness.
The United States, as a champion of human rights abroad, has at
times been skeptical and even critical when other states have granted
de facto amnesty, thereby allowing impunity for gross violations of
human rights. Nonetheless, some now argue that the United States
should turn a blind eye to the mounting evidence suggesting that U.S.
government officials formulated and implemented a policy of torture. 8
This difficult situation raises fundamental issues on many levels, in-
cluding legal and political concerns, both internal and external. The
internal political dynamic, recognized and endorsed by President
Obama,9 argues against investigation and prosecution. This viewpoint
stresses the need to look ahead and deal with new problems, such as
national healthcare, instead of looking back at the difficult and poten-
tially divisive issue of prosecuting past acts of torture. Another inter-
nal concern, both legal and political, is that the United States' basic
constitutional principles have been undermined, particularly the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against the infliction of cruel and un-
usual punishment. 10 Ultimately at stake are the fundamental checks
and balances limiting executive authority that are critical to maintain-
ing the rule of law. A broader external political consideration is the
need to limit and repair the damage that mounting evidence of pro-
7. See Memorandum Opinion from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Le-
gal Counsel, to the Deputy Att'y Gen., Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm (superseding an
August 1, 2002 memorandum on torture).
8. See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Memos Spell Out Brutal C.I.A. Mode of Interrogation,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at Al.
The Justice Department on Thursday made public detailed memos describing brutal
interrogation techniques used by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The A.C.L.U. said the memos clearly describe criminal conduct and underscore the
need to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate who authorized and carried out
torture.
But Dennis C. Blair, the director of national intelligence, cautioned that the memos
were written at a time when C.I.A. officers were frantically working to prevent a repeat
of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
"Those methods, read on a bright, sunny, safe day in April 2009, appear graphic and
disturbing," said Mr. Blair in a written statement. "But we will absolutely defend those
who relied on these memos."
Id.
9. As President-elect, Barack Obama said that with regard to torture he had "a belief that we
need to look forward as opposed to looking backwards." David Johnston & Charlie Savage,
Obama Signals His Reluctance to Investigate Bush Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at Al.
10. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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torture policies has done to the reputation of the United States. Pur-
suing legal accountability for those responsible could contribute to
that goal.
Naturally, arguments about U.S. national security have been central
to the debate. The CIA's own reports insist that enhanced interroga-
tion techniques have been effective in yielding valuable information
that was vital to the national security of the United States.'1 The im-
portance of maintaining the morale and effectiveness of U.S. intelli-
gence operations is also cited as a reason not to prosecute. 12 The
thicket of issues, interests, and arguments raised is dense indeed.
Complicated though it may be, the debate over whether to prose-
cute Bush Administration officials for torture is a very important dis-
cussion to have. Unfortunately, this debate is being conducted on an
unduly narrow basis. It is true that under certain circumstances, tor-
ture violates U.S. federal law, 13 and this could therefore be the basis
11. See INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW, supra note 1, 250.
12. "[I]f agents were criminally investigated for doing something that top Bush administration
officials asked them to do and that they were assured was legal, intelligence officers would be
less willing to take risks to protect the country." Johnston & Savage, supra note 9.
13. See, for example, the Anti-Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2006), which
designates torture abroad as a crime but does not apply to torture in the U.S.
As used in this chapter-
(1) "torture" means an act committed by a person acting under the color of law
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than
pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody
or physical control;
(2) "severe mental pain or suffering" means the prolonged mental harm caused by
or resulting from -
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or
suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or applica-
tion, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe
physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-al-
tering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
senses or personality; and
(3) "United States" means the several States of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 2340.
(a) Offense. Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit tor-
ture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if
death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be pun-
ished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
(b) Jurisdiction. There is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited in subsection (a) if-
(1) the alleged offender is a national of the United States; or
(2) the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nation-
ality of the victim or alleged offender.
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for prosecution. State laws can also be applied to prosecute torture. 14
This might suggest that the decision is a matter solely within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of the United States. But in addition to domestic
laws, the United States has obligations under international law regard-
ing the crime of torture. These too are relevant to this important de-
bate, which should encompass, at the very least, four separate bodies
of law. The first is U.S. law establishing individual responsibility for
the crime of torture1 5 The second is international human rights law,
which potentially establishes state responsibility for any violations of
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-.
grading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 16 that are attributable to the
United States.17 The third is international humanitarian law, which
establishes standards for the treatment of those detained in the con-
text of armed conflict.18 This law can be the basis for both state re-
sponsibility and for individual criminal responsibility. The fourth is
the mandatory enforcement regime of the CAT,1 9 which establishes
individual criminal responsibility for torture via both international law
(defining and prohibiting torture) and national law (relied upon for
enforcement) .20
18 U.S.C. § 2340A.
14. The United States, in its initial report to the Committee Against Torture after ratifying the
Convention Against Torture, stated that
[e]very act of torture within the meaning of the Convention is illegal under existing
federal and state law, and any individual who commits such an act is subject to penal
sanctions as specified in criminal statutes. Such prosecutions do in fact occur in appro-
priate circumstances. Torture cannot be justified by exceptional circumstances, nor can
it be excused on the basis of an order from a superior officer.
U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article
19 of the Convention: Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1995, Addendum: United States of
America, 1 100, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Oct. 15, 1999).
15. See id; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
16. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter CAT].
17. "Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of
that State." Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, art. 1, in Report of the ILC on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR,
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001).
18. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, What Is International Humanitarian Law?, http://www.
icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/humanitarian-law-factsheet.
International humanitarian law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to
limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer
participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare. Interna-
tional humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict.
19. See CAT, supra note 16.
20. See id. arts. 1(1), 2(2), 4(1). The CAT's mandatory enforcement regime is discussed in
detail infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
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Enlarging this important internal debate to include relevant aspects
of international law should not be objectionable because international
torture norms are essentially core U.S. norms. Their application to
the United States helps to reinforce the values and processes of the
U.S. Constitution. The prohibition of torture under international law
mirrors the prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment, while the Torture Convention's enforcement re-
gime complements the rule of law under the Constitution by requiring
the investigation and prosecution of those who commit torture.
The shocking history of U.S. torture policy during the Bush Admin-
istration demonstrates that sometimes even the United States needs
external pressure to respect its own values. Had international legal
perspectives been more honestly factored into the response to 9/11
from the beginning, the shocking excesses of U.S. torture policy could
have at least been moderated. As it is, the reputation of the United
States has been seriously damaged, as has the cause of torture preven-
tion in general. Successful prosecution of U.S. officials may now be
difficult due to reliance upon OLC opinions, but the failure of the
United States to pursue the option of prosecution would only com-
pound any previous violations of the CAT. If the United States is
seen as shielding its officials from individual criminal accountability
for torture, this itself could constitute a violation of international law,
thus raising additional questions of state responsibility.
II. TORTURE AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE
RULE OF LAW POST-9/11
The horrors of 9/11 precipitated a national security crisis that
strained the nation and raised fundamental questions regarding the
commitment to a limited government, a key foundation of all human
rights. It has been a difficult test for the American legal system and
American political institutions. It is in the context of this pressing se-
curity crisis that the Bush Administration felt the need to alter the
balance between security and civil liberties when pursuing the aggres-
sive interrogation of detainees. Part of this effort included contacting
the OLC of the DOJ for legal guidance.
A. The Permissive Approach to Interrogation and Torture
Endorsed by the Office of Legal Counsel
The OLC is a small but important bureau within the DOJ that is-
sues written legal opinions about the proper interpretation of constitu-
tional provisions and statutes in response to requests by officials
2010]
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within the Executive Branch.21 According to a former head of the
OLC, it "is, and views itself as, the frontline institution responsible for
ensuring that the executive branch charged with executing the law is
itself bound by law."122 This is a vitally important job that calls for
superior skills, and many top judges and legal academics have served
in the-OLC.2 3
The Bush Administration, faced with the grave security crisis that
followed the 9/11 attacks on the United States, sought guidance from
the OLC on several issues, including advice about the legality of its
interrogation policies. The OLC responded by issuing some of the
most controversial opinions in its history. These opinions seem, in ret-
rospect, to have been geared not towards ensuring that the Executive
was bound by legal rules prohibiting torture, but towards freeing the
United States from any effective legal limit to the coercive interroga-
tion of detainees. Perhaps most notorious in this regard was the Au-
gust 1, 2002 opinion, which narrowly defined torture as follows:
[Tiorture is not the mere infliction of pain or suffering on another,
but is instead a step well removed. The victim must experience in-
tense pain or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to the pain that
would be associated with serious physical injury so severe that
death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of sig-
nificant bodily function will likely result. If that pain or suffering is
psychological, that suffering must result from one of the acts set
forth in the statute. In addition, these acts must cause long-term
mental harm. Indeed, this view of the criminal act of torture is con-
sistent with the term's common meaning. Torture is generally un-
derstood to involve "intense pain" or "excruciating pain," or put
another way, "extreme anguish of body or mind." In short, reading
21. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Yoo's Labour's Lost: Jack Goldsmith's Nine-Month Saga in the
Office of Legal Counsel, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 795, 796 (2008) (reviewing JACK GOLD-
SMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
(2007)).
Compared to other divisions of the Department of Justice, OLC is tiny. It consists of
only a handful of lawyers, but its influence is disproportionate to its size. It was the one
place in government where one expected-or at least received, whether wanted or
not-objective, candid advice on the interpretation of the law.
Kmiec, supra, at 796. According to Jack Goldsmith,
The head of OLC must be a careful lawyer, must exercise good judgment, must make
clear his independence, must maintain the confidence of his superiors, and must help
the President find legal ways to achieve his ends, especially in connection with national
security. OLC's success over the years has depended on its ability to balance these
competing considerations-to preserve its fidelity to law while at the same time finding
a way, if possible, to approve presidential actions.
GOLDSMITH, supra, at 38-39 (2007), quoted in Kmiec, supra, at 796.
22. GOLDSMITH, supra note 21, at 33.
23. See Kmiec, supra note 21, at 796 & n.7.
[Vol. 59:775780
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the definition of torture as a whole, it is plain that the term encom-
passes only extreme acts. 24
That opinion also set out a radical view of executive authority, as-
serting that "[a]ny effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of
battlefield combatants would violate the Constitution's sole vesting of
the commander-in-chief authority in the President. '25 This opinion
has come under scathing criticism since it became public. 26 Although
it was signed by Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee, who was then
the head of the OLC, this opinion reflects the perspective of Deputy
Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, who to this day continues to
defend its reasoning and conclusions. 27 Yoo was also the author of
another opinion that discussed the extremely narrow concept of tor-
ture set out in the quotation above,28 and which elaborated upon his
correspondingly expansive notion of how the President's commander
24. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Al-
berto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 13 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter OLC Torture Opinion] (emphasis ad-
ded) (citations omitted), http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterroga-
tionmemo20020801.pdf.
25. Id. at 39.
26. According to Jeremy Waldron,
The quality of Bybee's legal work here is a disgrace when one considers the service to
which this analysis is being put. Bybee is an intelligent man, these are obvious errors,
and the Department of Justice-as the executive department charged with special re-
sponsibility for the integrity of the legal system-had a duty to take special care with
this most important of issues. Bybee's mistakes distort the character of the legal prohi-
bition on torture and create an impression that ihere is more room for the lawful inflic-
tion of pain in interrogation than a casual acquaintance with the antitorture statute
might suggest.
Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L.
REv. 1681, 1708 (2005); see Koh Testimony, supra note 6, at 158; Michael Traynor, Citizenship in
a Time of Repression, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 1, 5 n.18 (cataloging criticisms of the Bybee memoran-
dum). Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard has stated,
The prohibition against torture has been made absolute in universal and regional in-
struments. It is further prohibited in all circumstances by both treaty law and custom-
ary law. . . . [T]he interpretation of what amounts to torture must be made in
accordance with the times, and the courts in our contemporary era have lowered the
threshold from what would have been considered "ill treatment" twenty-five years ago
to qualify as "torture" today. The selective reading of treaties and case law by the
Office of Legal Counsel will not change these facts.
Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard, Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture Under International Law:
The Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 9, 40-41 (2005).
27. See Carol J. Williams, Dealing with the "Torture Memos;" As John Yoo Strongly Defends
His Legal Rationale, Jay Bybee Stays Under the Radar, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at Al.
28. Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., & Robert J. Delahunty, Spe-
cial Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def. 43 (Jan. 9, 2002), in THE
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 43 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds.,
2005) [hereinafter Yoo Memorandum].
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in chief authority precludes legal limits upon his right to interrogate
enemy combatants.2 9
Abu Zubaydah was the first person captured and detained by the
United States who was believed to be a high ranking member of al
Qaeda. The CIA believed he was withholding vital information that
could not be obtained via previously authorized interrogation tech-
niques, but it faced the challenge of determining how far it could go in
interrogating him. It was in this context that the OLC issued an opin-
ion that authorized ten enhanced interrogation techniques-including
waterboarding-that supposedly would not violate the prohibition of
torture under U.S. federal law, as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2340A.30
Subsequent OLC memos concluded that the United States' use of en-
hanced interrogation techniques abroad would not violate U.S. obliga-
tions under applicable treaties or customary international law.3' One
of the principal reasons offered for this conclusion was that "U.S. res-
ervations, understandings, and declarations [to the CAT] ensure that
our international obligations mirror the standards of 18 U.S.C. Sec.
2340A." 32
The radical approach taken by Bybee and Yoo did not survive to
the end of President Bush's two terms in office. Soon after he took
over as head of the OLC in 2003, Jack Goldsmith withdrew the worst
of these opinions,33 although the OLC continued to issue extremely
29. Id. at 47.
30. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al Qaeda
Operative 2, 11, 16, 18 (Aug. 1, 2002).
31. Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen.
Counsel, Dep't of Def., Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the
United States 2 (Mar. 14, 2003).
32. Id.
33. For example, Goldsmith withdrew the legal standards memo drafted by Daniel Levin. See
Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to the Deputy Att'y Gen., Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm (superseding the
August 1, 2002 OLC memorandum on torture). See also Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Con-
servative: Inside the Secret Legal Battle over the War on Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 9, 2007,
at 41, 42, stating that
[d]uring his first weeks on the job, Goldsmith had discovered that the Office of Legal
Counsel had written two legal opinions-both drafted by Goldsmith's friend Yoo, who
served as a deputy in the office-about the authority of the executive branch to con-
duct coercive interrogations. Goldsmith considered these opinions, now known as the
"torture memos," to be tendentious, overly broad and legally flawed, and he fought to
change them. He also found himself challenging the White House on a variety of other
issues, ranging from surveillance to the trial of suspected terrorists. His efforts suc-
ceeded in bringing the Bush administration somewhat closer to what Goldsmith consid-
ered the rule of law-although at considerable cost to Goldsmith himself. By the end
of his tenure, he was worn out.
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permissive and highly questionable guidance on torture throughout
the years of the Bush Administration. In June of 2009, the OLC de-
clared in a memo to the Attorney General that, pursuant to an Execu-
tive Order from President Barack Obama, "Officers, employees, and
other agents of the United States Government may not, in conducting
interrogations, rely upon any interpretation of the law governing in-
terrogation ... issued by the Department of Justice between Septem-
ber 11, 2001, and January 20, 2009."'34 Thus, the contorted logic of
these OLC opinions was rejected as an inaccurate statement of both
U.S. and international law. 35
B. The Current Political Debate on Torture
Many sectors of society participate in the political debate on possi-
ble accountability for past acts of torture. This Section will briefly
consider some of the principal political and legal arguments formu-
lated by participants in that debate.
1. Should a Necessity Defense Apply?
Some, such as Senator Lindsey Graham, have argued that the ac-
tions of the Bush Administration officials were justifiable because
they did what was necessary to defend the United States. This is the
"necessity defense." Senator Graham contends that with an ongoing
military threat like al Qaeda, "[t]he only way we're going to stop [the]
enemy from attacking us is to find good information and hit them
before they hit us."' 36 These techniques have survived for about five
hundred years, he argues, because they work.37 He further argues
that we should move forward so that we do not "unnecessarily impede
the ability of this country to defend itself against an enemy who is...
thinking and plotting their way back into America. '38 Senator Gra-
ham's argument compliments what has been called the "ticking time
bomb" scenario, 39 which is based on the premise that if people knew
that a nuclear bomb was hidden in an American city, most people
34. Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Coun-
sel, to the Att'y Gen., Withdrawal of Office of Legal Counsel Opinion (June 11, 2009), http://
www.usdoj.gov/olc/2009/memo-barron2009.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
35. See Rosen, supra note 33.
36. What Went Wrong: Torture and the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter What Went Wrong] (statement of Sen. Graham), available at
2009 WL 1317264.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1426
(2005).
2010]
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would be willing to use any means, even acts constituting torture, to
find it before it goes off.40
2. Alternatives to Torture
Some do not find the necessity defense or the ticking time bomb
argument to be particularly convincing.41 For one thing, they question
whether torture techniques are faster or more efficient than other, le-
gal techniques that are set out in the U.S. Army Manual. Senator
Russell Feingold, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee,
stated, "I can tell you that nothing I have seen ... indicates that the
torture techniques authorized by the last administration were neces-
sary or that they were the best way to get information out of detain-
ees. ' '42  Matthew Alexander, 43  an experienced interrogator,
maintained that in his experience, torture techniques "served only to
harden the resolve of the detainee and made them more resistant to
40. See id. (noting that when Alan Dershowitz asked for a show of hands as to how many
would support use of nonlethal torture in a ticking time bomb scenario, virtually all members of
the audience raised a hand). The argument remains controversial. See Editorial, Keeps on Tick-
ing; Bush Continues to Invoke the Time Bomb Rationale for Torture. Congress Should Defuse It,
L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 2007, at A18, which states,
It's time that Bush was challenged not only on the mixed message he is sending about
the propriety of torture but on its underlying rationale: the so-called Ticking Time
Bomb Scenario.... Former President Clinton ... observed that if there were a formal
exception to laws against torture, "people [will] just drive a truck through it, and they'll
say, [they] thought it was covered by the exception."
Maintaining the prohibition of torture and accountability for torture, even under the ticking
bomb scenario, is a key point. See Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?,
81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1167 (2005), which states,
In short, my answer to the Ticking Time Bomb scenario is simple. We should never
preauthorize torture. If the President believes he must for the good of the country
order torture, and if that order is carried out by a lower official, that official must be
prepared to face the legal, political, and moral consequences of his actions. Perhaps
they will not be impeached, prosecuted, convicted, or morally condemned.... Anyone,
even the President of the United States, who decides he must torture or order torture,
because he feels it is absolutely imperative, should do so at his own peril.
But see Jens David Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 193, 218-226, arguing,
based on distinctions from the German penal code, that torture can never be justified, even by
the ticking bomb scenario, but that it might nonetheless provide an excuse, after the fact, that
could preclude prosecution or conviction.
41. See 155 CoNo. REC. S6360 (daily ed. June 9, 2009) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse) ("[Wie
were told that torturing detainees was justified by American lives saved-saved as a result of
actionable intelligence produced on the waterboard. That is the clincher, they stay [sic]-lives
saved at the price of a little unpleasantness. But is it true? That is far from clear.").
42. Bobby Ghosh, Why the CIA Turned Down Dick Cheney, TIME, May 14, 2009, http://www.
time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1898385,00.html.
43. Matthew Alexander was an interrogator in Iraq who has conducted more than 300 interro-
gations and supervised more than 1,000 others. What Went Wrong, supra note 36 (statement of
Matthew Alexander read for the record by Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse).
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interrogation. ' 44 Moreover, he argued that torture practices are used
as the number one recruiting tools for suicide bombers. 45  "What
works best in the ticking time bomb scenario," he argues, "is relation-
ship building, which is not a time-consuming effort when conducted by
a properly trained interrogator [in] non-coercive deception. ' 46 Like-
wise, Ali Soufan, also an experienced interrogator, testified that so-
called enhanced interrogation techniques are "ineffective, slow and
unreliable, and as a result harmful to our efforts to defeat al Qaeda. ' 47
Furthermore, he contends that the techniques are ineffective because
terrorists are trained to handle worse.48 According to Soufan, there
are legal approaches that employ intelligent interrogation techniques,
which are more effective than torture.49 Both the Obama Administra-
tion and the Senate Intelligence Committee are said to be investigat-
ing the effectiveness of different interrogation techniques.
50
3. Enormous Pressure Excuse
Others, such as former Attorney General Michael Mukasey, argue
that the acts of Bush Administration officials were excusable because,
after 9/11, they were reacting to enormous fear and pressure to pre-
vent another attack.51 Senator Graham adds that it is not fair to judge
the prior Administration in hindsight because those who are judging
did not have to make the decision.52 Like Mukasey, Senator Graham
argues that after the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration
''went on the offensive," trying to make sure that a terrorist attack did
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (testimony of Ali Soufan). Soufan is the Chief Executive Officer of International Stra-
tegic Consultancy Firm and a former FBI supervisory special agent. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See 155 CONG. REC. S5305 (daily ed. May 11, 2009) (statement of Sen. Alexander), stating
that
[tihe President is following his own advice about looking forward by asking the Na-
tional Security Council to review what tactics would be appropriate when terrorists are
captured who might have information about imminent attacks on Americans. The Sen-
ate Intelligence Committee is conducting its own review of tactics and is considering
expanding the briefing process for interrogation tactics.
51. See Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 34 (testimony of Attorney General Mukasey), stating that
[w]e have people demanding that people push the law to the limit, and then we have
people saying don't push the law to the limit and that you are subject to criticism and
prosecution afterward, that that is a very unwise cycle.
After September 11, there was an enormous amount of pressure to find the maxi-
mum that could be done.
52. See What Went Wrong, supra note 36.
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not happen again. 53 Furthermore, he argues that although the offi-
cials made mistakes, the fact that they took a very aggressive interpre-
tation of what the law would allow does not constitute a crime. 54
Similarly, Professor Robert Turner, Associate Director of the Na-
tional Center for Security Law at the University of Virginia School of
Law, argues that rather than pursuing prosecution or creating a truth
commission, the public should just recognize that "good people, fear-
ful for the safety of their fellow Americans, trying to stop the next
attack, made some very bad decisions. ' '55 Professor Turner compares
the Bush Administration officials to the Roosevelt and Hoover Ad-
ministration officials who, he says, detained Japanese-Americans dur-
ing WWII because they were frightened and because they "wanted to
prevent another Pearl Harbor. ' 56 According to Turner, they all
wanted to "save the lives of their fellow Americans. '' 57
4. The Obama Administration's Views
Although President Obama has affirmed that no one is above the
law, he has also made it clear that he wants to move forward, prefera-
bly without criminal prosecutions. 58 His Administration, including
Attorney General Eric Holder, has consistently maintained that CIA
officials who acted in good faith reliance on OLC opinions should not
be prosecuted.59 His aides have stated that President Obama does not
53. Id.
54. Senator Graham argued,
The nation was rattled. The administration went on the offensive.... They were going
to make sure this didn't happen again.... But they made mistakes. They saw the law
many times as a nicety that we couldn't afford, so they took a very aggressive interpre-
tation of what the law would allow. And that came back to bite us. It always does. But
that's not a crime.
Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert
Gibbs (July 13, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Briefing-by-White-House-
Press-Secretary-Robert-Gibbs-7-13-09/ [hereinafter July 13, 2009 Press Briefing] (explaining that
President Obama believes that "our efforts are better focused looking forward"); Office of the
Press Sec'y, The White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs (Apr. 20, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Briefing-by-White-House-Press-Secretary-Robert-
Gibbs-4-20-09/ [hereinafter Apr. 20, 2009 Press Briefing] ("The President ... believes that rather
than looking backward and fighting this backward, that it's important to move our country for-
ward. That's what he signaled by banning the use of these techniques, and that's where his focus
is.").
59. See July 13, 2009 Press Briefing, supra note 58 ("[T]he President, and I think the Attorney
General, all agree that anyone who followed the law, that was acting in good faith of the gui-
dance that they were provided within the four corners of the law will not and should not be
prosecuted.").
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want CIA officials to be checking over their shoulders as they defend
the country. 60 These are all valid points, but they beg the question of
whether the United States is subject to any international legal obliga-
tion to investigate acts of torture, prosecute acts of torture, or both.
This Article will briefly present the history of prohibiting torture, and
it will then focus on the relevance of international law to the decision
of whether to investigate and prosecute those who are responsible for
the use of torture as an interrogation technique.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NORM PROHIBITING TORTURE
The prohibition of torture, like other aspects of the modern interna-
tional law of human rights, first emerged as a norm at the national
level. The notion of human rights developed in philosophy, and it was
spread by forces as diffuse as violent revolution and peaceable incor-
poration into constitutions and legislation. The U.S. Constitution and
France's 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen are
examples of this. From their origins in national law and practice,
these norms, including the prohibition of torture, have percolated into
the international legal arena Via their incorporation into treaties such
as the CAT, and through their acceptance, based on state practice, as
part of customary international law.
The President took the extraordinary step of stopping [the enhanced interrogation]
techniques from ever being used again as part of his administration. The President
does believe and the Attorney General said quite clearly that those that believed in
good faith that these techniques had been declared legal by the Department should not
be prosecuted.
Apr. 20, 2009 Press Briefing, supra note 58. See Nomination of Stephen W. Preston to Be Gen-
eral Counsel of the CIA and Robert S. Litt to Be General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Intelligence, 111th Cong. (2009), available
at 2009 WLNR 9700487 (testimony of Robert S. Litt, Gen. Counsel of the Office of the Director
of Nat'l Intelligence) ("I certainly believe that it is essential to the operation of the government
that people be able to rely on opinions from the Justice Department without fear that those
opinions will later be pulled back from them and leaving them exposed to criminal liability.").
Current Attorney General Eric Holder has stated,
[F]or those people who were involved in the interrogation and relied upon, in good
faith and adhered to the memorandum created by the Justice Department's Office of
Legal Counsel, it is our intention not to prosecute and not to investigate those people.
I have also indicated that we will follow the law and the facts and let that take us
wherever it may. A good prosecutor can only say that.
155 CONG. REc. S5305 (daily ed. May 11, 2009) (reprinting Alexander-Holder Exchange on In-
vestigation of Interrogation Techniques: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice &
Science of the Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Att'y Gen. Eric
Holder)).
60. See Nat'l Pub. Radio, NPR Talk of the Nation, The Legacy of Bush's "War on Terror"
(audio file) (Jan. 12, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=99253486 (ex-
plaining how, although then-President-elect Obama contended that no one is above the law, he
did not want those who defend our country to be looking over their shoulders).
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A. International Humanitarian Law
The prohibition against the use of torture first gained international
status as an aspect of the laws of war, or "international humanitarian
law." In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln signed the Lieber Code,
the first real codification of the customary laws of war. It set out a
broad range of rules, including a prohibition of torture, stressing that
"[m]ilitary necessity does not admit of cruelty ... nor of torture to
extort confessions." 61
Today, the prohibition against torture is codified in international
humanitarian law by Article 17 of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War
Convention,62 and perhaps most significantly, by Common Article 363
of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. This is especially significant
because the International Court of Justice has interpreted Common
Article 3 to be a reflection of the customary norm and minimum stan-
dard of humanity required in both international and internal armed
conflicts. 64 And in an opinion focusing more on detention and trial
than upon torture per se, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that all
noncitizen prisoners, including those classified by the U.S. govern-
ment as "enemy combatants," have rights under Article 3 of the Ge-
neva Conventions. 65
The Lieber Code was prepared as a set of internal legal guides for
the Armies of the United States in the Field, and it was issued under
the authority of the President. At the same time, as a codification of
the customary law of war, the Lieber Code purported to set out the
61. General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States
in the Field (Apr. 24, 1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code], reprinted in 2 FRANCES LIEBER, CONTRI-
BUTIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 245, 247-74 (1881).
62. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 17, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, which states,
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on
prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of
war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleas-
ant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
63. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
3(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3517, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (IV)], which
states,
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities ... shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely....
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture[.]
64. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 113-14 (June 27).
65. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 570, 631 (2006) (noting that Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions protects enemy combatants).
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international laws and customs of war that were implicitly accepted by
states at that time. Within decades, many other countries adopted
guidelines parallel to the Lieber Code, solidifying the status of its
rules as part of customary international law. A scant forty-four years
after President Lincoln signed the Lieber Code, the 1907 Hague con-
vention and its regulations formally codified a version of those basic
rules into a broadly accepted multilateral treaty.66 This brief history
demonstrates the folly of viewing the prohibition of torture under in-
ternational humanitarian law as an external norm imposed upon the
United States. The United States is as much the author of that prohi-
bition as its subject.
B. International Human Rights Law
The prohibition of torture is not only a fundamental norm of inter-
national humanitarian law, it is also part of international human rights
law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,67 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,68 and the CAT69 all incorpo-
rate an unequivocal prohibition of torture. The CAT codifies an
agreed-upon definition of torture70 and establishes obligations for
state parties, including the international enforcement regime dis-
cussed in greater detail below.71
The basic obligation of state parties to the CAT is to "take effective
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts
of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction. ' 7 2 This obligation is
absolute, insofar as it provides both that "[n]o exceptional circum-
66. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 4, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277.
67. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg. U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
68. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368.
69. See CAT, supra note 16.
70. The CAT provides,
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Id. art. 1(1).
71. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
72. See CAT, supra note 16, art. 2(1).
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stances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as
a justification of torture, '73 and that "[a]n order from a superior of-
ficer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of
torture." 74
C. U.S. Ambivalence Towards International Human Rights Treaties
Since their emergence after World War II, the United States has
had issues with international human rights treaties, generally prefer-
ring to apply U.S. constitutional standards, which, in the field of civil
and political rights, are generally consistent with and parallel to inter-
national human rights standards. After decades of declining to ratify
international human rights treaties, the United States broke the
logjam by ratifying the Genocide Convention in 1988. Since then, the
United States has ratified a number of human rights treaties, but it
invariably does so with reservations considered necessary to address
U.S. concerns.
In 1990, the United States accepted the CAT with a number of "res-
ervations, understandings, and declarations" (RUDs), only a few of
which merit consideration here. The first reservation provides
[t]hat the United States considers itself bound by the obligation
under article 16 to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment," only insofar as the term "cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment" means the cruel, unusual and inhu-
mane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/
or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States. 75
The most relevant of the "understandings" provides
[t]hat with reference to Article 1, the United States understands
that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically in-
tended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that
mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by
or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or threatened inflic-
tion of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or
application, or threatened administration or application, of mind al-
tering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt pro-
foundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent
death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be sub-
jected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administra-
73. Id. art. 2(2).
74. Id. art. 2(3).
75. U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed.,
Oct. 27, 1990), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/tortres.html.
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tion or application of mind altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
7 6
Other RUDs rejected the compromissory clause in Article 30(2),
which allows disputes between parties to be submitted to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice,77 and declared that under U.S. law, the CAT is
not self-executing. 78 This latter declaration means that, as a matter of
U.S. domestic law, the CAT cannot be directly invoked as a legal stan-
dard within U.S. courts. Nonetheless, it cannot limit the obligations of
the United States under the CAT because non-self-executing treaties
bind the United States externally as much as any other treaty.
79
IV. THE MODERN REALITY: OVERLAPPING TORTURE STANDARDS
UNDER U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
It makes little sense to debate U.S. torture policy today without ref-
erence to the reality of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing tor-
ture standards that presently exist under U.S. and international law.
On the issue of torture, the United States is subject to multiple stan-
dards, all of which have their origin in the domestic practice of the
United States and other liberal democracies. These include the
United States' constitutional standard that bans torture as a form of
"cruel and unusual punishment,"80 the rules of international humani-
tarian law that ban torture of POWs and other non-combatants, and
the codified torture convention standard, set out in the U.S. imple-
menting legislation, that defines and criminalizes torture.8'
As a party to the CAT, the United States has obligations under that
treaty as well, although these are subject to the United States' reserva-
76. Id.
77. "[P]ursuant to article 30(2) the United States declares that it does not consider itself
bound by Article 30(1), but reserves the right specifically to agree to follow this or any other
procedure for arbitration in a particular case." Id. reservation 2.
78. "The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following declarations: (1) That the
United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 16 of the Convention are not
self-executing." Id. declaration 1.
79. Whether the U.S. government considers a particular provision of a treaty to be self-exe-
cuting or non-self-executing is entirely a matter of U.S. domestic law, and therefore such a provi-
sion cannot increase or decrease the obligations of the United States under the treaty. See Louis
Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 406, 425 (1989) (noting that
"[tihe international obligation of the United States under a treaty is immediate, whether a treaty
is self-executing or not.... [T]he United States has an obligation to enact necessary legislation
promptly so as to enable it to carry out its obligations under the treaty"). See also Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, opened for signature May 23, 1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
which provides that "[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty."
80. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006).
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tions described above. Interestingly, the United States has made no
formal reservations regarding the mandatory criminal enforcement re-
gime established under the CAT.
V. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND THE MANDATORY
ENFORCEMENT REGIME APPLICABLE TO TORTURE
After defining torture, the CAT obliges state parties to prevent acts
of torture in any territory under their jurisdiction, but it also incorpo-
rates a mandatory criminal enforcement regime. All state parties to
the CAT accept both the obligation to ensure that acts of torture, as
defined by the CAT, are offenses under their national criminal law
and also the obligation to make them punishable by appropriate pen-
alties. 82 They further agree to take such measures as may be neces-
sary to establish jurisdiction over those offenses when they occur
within the jurisdictional reach of the state, including both acts by na-
tionals and acts by non-nationals within the territory of the state. 83
Each state party is similarly obliged to establish jurisdiction when a
person who is alleged to have committed an act of torture is present
within its territory,84 and in such a case, the state party is obliged to
take him into custody or to take other legal measures to ensure his
presence in court.85 Then, the state party must immediately make a
preliminary inquiry into the facts.86
Any time an alleged torturer is present within the territory of a
CAT state party, that state party must either submit the case to prose-
cution or extradite him.8 7 The obligation to try or extradite (aut
dedere autjudicare) is well known in international criminal law, and its
inclusion in the CAT comes close to establishing torture as a universal
jurisdiction crime. Each state party is also obligated to ensure that its
competent authorities conduct a prompt and impartial investigation
whenever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture
has been committed within any territory under its jurisdiction.88
82. See CAT, supra note 16, art. 4.
83. See id. art. 5.
84. See id. art. 5(2).
85. See id. art. 6(1).
86. See id. art. 6(2).
87. The CAT provides,
The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have com-
mitted any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases contemplated in
article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution.
Id. art. 7(1).
88. See id. art. 12.
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The CAT then sets out two rules that are fundamental to the pre-
vention of torture, which may nonetheless have been violated by the
recent detention, interrogation, and trial policies applied by the
United States to suspected terrorists. The CAT first obliges state par-
ties to ensure that any statement that is made as a result of torture
shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings.89 Procedures for
trials before U.S. military commissions have not always required re-
spect for this rule.90 Equally troubling is the United States' policy of
extraordinary rendition, according to which detainees have sometimes
been sent to face interrogation in countries (such as Egypt) where
they face the real possibility of the most horrific forms of torture. 91
This policy violates the principle of non-refoulement, which forbids
parties from sending a person to another state when "there are sub-
89. See id. art. 15.
90. Referring to the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948A (2006), Michael
Reisman notes,
Nor does the Act absolutely preclude the admissibility of evidence secured by torture.
While section 948r states in subsection (b) that "[a] statement obtained by use of tor-
ture shall not be admissible in a military commission," subsection (c) allows the admis-
sion of evidence gained before December 30, 2005, when "the degree of coercion is
disputed" if the military judge finds it reliable and of probative value and its admission
would serve the interests of justice. As for a statement obtained after December 30,
2005, subsection (d) allows its admission when "the degree of coercion is disputed" if
the military judge finds it reliable and of probative value, its admission would serve the
interests of justice, and, under subsection (d)(3), "the interrogation methods used to
obtain the statement do not amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment prohib-
ited by section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005." Considering that the
congressional battle in 2006 concerned alleged insufficiencies in the 2005 legislation,
readers might be excused for feeling that they had been led through a dense forest of
legislative verbiage back to the starting point. And led on a fool's errand to boot, for if
the prohibition of torture was moved from Part B to Part A, its legal definition ceases
to be important. The lawfulness of torture in given instances is then to be governed by
the MNPD principles rather than by whether that treatment conforms to a particular
national or international legal definition.
W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, Holding the Center of the Law of Armed Conflict, 100
AM. J. INT'L L. 852, 854 (2006).
91. David Johnston, Terror Suspects Sent to Egypt By the Dozens, Panel Reports, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 2005, at A4.
The United States and other countries have forcibly sent dozens of terror suspects to
Egypt, according to a report released Wednesday by Human Rights Watch. The rights
group and the State Department have both said Egypt regularly uses extreme interro-
gation methods on detainees.... The report said the total number sent to Egypt since
the Sept. 11 attacks could be as high as 200 people. American officials have not dis-
puted that people have been sent to countries where detainees are subjected to extreme
interrogation tactics but have denied that anyone had been sent to another country for
the purpose of torture. Among other countries to which the United States has sent
detainees are Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Syria.
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stantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being sub-
jected to torture. '92
Although the United States' reservations to the CAT may reduce
state responsibility for acts of torture that are condoned by the U.S.
government, these reservations can in no way shield those individuals
who are responsible for torture from exposure to the international en-
forcement regime of the CAT. Whatever the domestic legal con-
straints, torture, as defined by international law, is a crime under
international law and potentially punishable under the laws of any of
the many states that are parties to the CAT. Despite its reservations
to the CAT, any U.S. officials who are responsible for acts of torture
are still subject to this standard and could be arrested abroad-as was
General Pinochet 93-to face universal jurisdiction prosecutions.
A. Effect of Reliance upon OLC Opinions
At his nomination hearing, current CIA Director Leon Panetta
stressed that CIA employees are required to operate according to the
guidelines outlined in OLC opinions, and they should not be punished
for doing so. 9 4 Nevertheless, the Obama Administration has ex-
pressed a willingness to prosecute any person who deliberately vio-
lated the law and who took action above and beyond the standard in
the now-repudiated OLC opinions.95 Early on, Attorney General
92. CAT, supra note 16, art. 3.
93. See Christine M. Chinkin, INTERNATIONAL DECISION, United Kingdom House of
Lords, (Spanish request for extradition). Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte
Pinochet Ugarte (no. 3). [1999], 2 WLR 827, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 703 (1999).
94. Leon Panetta stated,
I... believe, as the president has indicated, that those individuals who operated pursu-
ant to a legal opinion that indicated that that was proper and legal ought not to be
prosecuted or investigated and that they . . . acted pursuant to the law as it was
presented to them by the attorney general ....
But when you're an employee at the CIA, you have to operate based on the legal
opinions that are provided you from the Justice Department from the attorney general.
If you-you know there has to be some guidelines here. There has to be come stan-
dards, and whether you agree or disagree, and I certainly do not agree with ... that
particular opinion, nevertheless when you go out there and ... take the kind of actions
that have to be taken and rely on those opinions, I do not think that you ought to be
prosecuted for that.
Hearing on the Nomination of Leon Panetta to Be Director of the CIA: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Intelligence (testimony of Leon Panetta), 111th Cong. (2009), available at 2009
WLNR 2318014.
95. See id. ("I also happen to believe with the president that if we find that there were those
who deliberately violated the law ... and deliberately took actions which were above and be-
yond the standard that were-were presented to them, then obviously in those limited cases
there should be a prosecution.").
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Eric Holder promised to follow "the facts and the evidence and the
law,"' 96 but he stated that reliance on an OLC opinion would be a
huge factor in deciding whether to prosecute an official. 97 More re-
cently, he has confirmed that whatever may result from the DOJ's
"preliminary review"9 of possible violations, those people who fol-
lowed OLC opinions will not be subject to prosecution.99
In the absence of some type of special circumstances, U.S. courts
would be unlikely to convict a U.S. government official for actions
that were taken pursuant to an OLC opinion. In any event, no such
case is likely to be filed because Attorney General Holder has made it
clear that "the Department of Justice will not prosecute anyone who
acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal guidance given by
the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the interrogation of detain-
ees." 100 Thus, as a practical matter, OLC opinions will provide full
legal cover for any CIA interrogators who relied on the OLC's
opinions.
96. Hearing on the Nomination of Eric Holder to Be Attorney General Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary (testimony of Att'y Gen. Eric Holder), 111th Cong. (2009), available at 2009 WL
106400.
97. See id. ("An OLC opinion that gave a person the ability to do something that was reasona-
bly relied on, was appropriate ... would be something that would obviously have to be taken
into account in deciding whether somebody acted appropriately or not. That would be a huge
factor.").
98. Attorney General Holder stated,
I have concluded that the information known to me warrants opening a preliminary
review into whether federal laws were violated in connection with the interrogation of
specific detainees at overseas locations. The Department regularly uses preliminary
reviews to gather information to determine whether there is sufficient predication to
warrant a full investigation of a matter. I want to emphasize that neither the opening of
a preliminary review nor, if evidence warrants it, the commencement of a full investiga-
tion, means that charges will necessarily follow.
Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a Preliminary Review into the Interroga-
tion of Certain Detainees para. 2 (Aug. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Holder Statement Announcing
Preliminary Review], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/aglspeeches/2009/ag-speech-0908241.
html (last visited Aug. 26, 2009).
99. Id.
100. Attorney General Holder stated that
The men and women in our intelligence community perform an incredibly important
service to our nation, and they often do so under difficult and dangerous circum-
stances.... [T]hey need to be protected from legal jeopardy when they act in good faith
and within the scope of legal guidance. That is why I have made it clear in the past that
the Department of Justice will not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within
the scope of the legal guidance given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the inter-
rogation of detainees. I want to reiterate that point today, and to underscore the fact
that this preliminary review will not focus on those individuals.
Id. para. 4 (emphasis added).
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B. Should the Authors of OLC Opinions on Torture
Be Held Responsible?
What of those who wrote or approved of the excessively permissive
OLC opinions that opened the door for torture with domestic impu-
nity? If following OLC guidance provides such a strong shield against
future prosecution, that guidance should at least accurately reflect the
state of the law. But under political pressure to issue opinions that
allowed enhanced interrogation techniques, OLC lawyers did not fol-
low the proper standard, once articulated by former Attorney General
Mukasey, that they should "adhere to the law and not concern them-
selves with what might be politically acceptable later on." 10 1 Instead,
the authors of OLC memos defended torture techniques by relying on
"hypertechnical interpretations that disregard[ed] the prohibitions in
our laws. 102 This clearly violated the rule of law, a core American
ideal113
So far, the Obama Administration's position is that Bush Adminis-
tration lawyers who wrote or approved of the OLC opinions should
not be prosecuted. Again, both President Obama and Attorney Gen-
eral Holder have suggested that the focus should be on moving for-
ward. 10 4 Although they assert that no one is above the law, they do
not want to criminalize policy differences between Administrations. 10 5
101. Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. (2008) (testimony of former Att'y Gen. Mukasey), available at 2008 WL 2673974.
102. What Went Wrong, supra note 36 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
103. See OLC, National Security Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=36
71&wit-id=2629 [hereinafter National Security Nominations] (statement of Sen. Leahy, Chair-
man, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("The costs have been enormous, to our core American ideals,
the rule of law, and the principle that in America, no one-not even a President-is above the
law.").
104. See Barack Obama, Press Conference by the President (Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/PressConferencebythePresident/. President Obama stated,
My view is ... that nobody is above the law, and if there are clear instances of wrong-
doing, that people should be prosecuted just like any ordinary citizen; but that gener-
ally speaking, I'm more interested in looking forward than I am in looking backwards.
I want to pull everybody together, including, by the way, the-all the members of the
intelligence community who have done things the right way and have been working
hard to protect America, and I think sometimes are painted with a broad brush without
adequate information.
Id.
105. See Hearing on the Nomination of Eric Holder to Be Attorney General Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 2009 WL 106400 (testimony of Eric
Holder) (testifying that although no one is above the law and that although he promises to
follow the evidence, the facts, and the law, that he agrees with President Obama that "we don't
want to criminalize policy differences that might exist between the outgoing administration and
the administration that is about to take over"). Attorney General Holder also stated,
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Attorney General Holder acknowledges that the decisions the Bush
Administration had to make were difficult, 106 but respect for the rule
of law must limit the compromise of fundamental legal principle in the
name of sympathy and political accommodation.
C. Rule of Law
CIA Director Leon Panetta and others have expressed confidence
that the torture dilemma in the United States is a concern of the
past, 10 7 citing President Obama's Executive Order that officially bans
torture108 as a turning point. Likewise, others, such as Senator
Charles Schumer and Senator Lamar Alexander, have expressed con-
fidence that President Obama and the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee's investigation into interrogation techniques will end torture in the
United States. 10 9
I will look at the [Office of Professional Responsibility's] report and make a determina-
tion as to what we wanted to do with it. It deals ... not only with the attorneys, but
people that they interacted with, so I think we will gain some insights by reviewing that
report. Our desire is not to do anything that would be perceived as political or parti-
san. We do want to report, to the extent that we can do that, but as I said, my responsi-
bility is to enforce the laws of this nation and to the extent that we see violations of
those laws, we will take the appropriate action.
155 CONG. REC. S5305 (daily ed. May 11, 2009) (reprinting Alexander-Holder Exchange on In-
vestigation of Interrogation Techniques: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice,
and Science of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. (May 7, 2009) (testimony of Att'y
Gen. Holder)).
106. See Hearing on the Nomination of Eric Holder to Be Attorney General Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Eric Holder), available at 2009 WL
106400 ("The decisions that were made by the prior administration were difficult ones. It is an
easy thing in some ways to look and in hindsight be critical of the decisions they made.").
107. See Hearing on the Nomination of Leon Panetta to Be Director of the CIA: Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on Intelligence, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/queryfD?rlll:56:./templ-rlllLrGhPw::. Senator Feinstein stated,
President Obama has made clear that his selection of Leon Panetta was intended as a
clean break with the past-a break from secret detentions and coercive interrogation, a
break from outsourcing its work to a small army of contractors, and a break from anal-
ysis that was not only wrong, but the product of bad practice that helped lead our
nation to war.
Id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein). Attorney General Holder stated,
And yet, having said that, the president-elect and I are, I think, both worried, dis-
turbed, by what we have seen, what we've heard. The pledge that he has made and that
I will make is that we will make sure that the interrogation techniques that are sanc-
tioned by the Justice Department are consistent with our treaty obligations, the Geneva
Treaty obligations that we have, and will be effective at the same time.
Id. (statement of Att'y Gen. Eric Holder).
108. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 16 (Jan. 27, 2009) (revoking Exec. Order No.
13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 141 (July 20, 2007)) (declaring that detainees shall not be subjected to any
interrogation technique not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual).
109. Senator Schumer stated,
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But there is a strong argument to be made that what happened was
an institutional problem and that it can happen again, even under a
new administration.' 10 Accordingly, we cannot simply "move for-
ward." It is therefore vitally important to investigate and to "get to
the bottom of what happened.""' After 9/11, the power of the Execu-
tive Branch was permitted to grow unchecked under the umbrella of
national security. As Senator Patrick Leahy exclaimed, the United
States turned from "a nation devoted to the rule of law to one ruled
by secret pronouncements of the executive."'112 Senator Arlen Spec-
ter declared, "I believe that historians will look back at this period as
the greatest expansion of executive authority that has gone unchecked
by Congress, and ... significantly unchecked by the courts. ' 113 Con-
gress and the courts, however, have only limited means at their dispo-
sal to check the power of the Executive Branch. Executive Branch
officials chose what to disclose.114 Moreover, intelligence officials no-
I welcome your nomination, not just because you will be a different kind of attorney
general but because Barack Obama will be a different kind of president. So I really
want to thank you. I believe that your nomination, should you be approved, will end
the rancid politization at the department, because it will mean an end to waterboarding
and other shameful forms of torture and because it will mean a full return to the rule of
law and our reputation around the world.
Hearing on the Nomination of Eric Holder to Be Attorney General Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Sen. Schumer), available at 2009 WL 106400. Sena-
tor Alexander stated,
The CIA has not used the tactics in question for several years. They are not being used
today. The Congress has since enacted laws that make clear that interrogation tactics
used by the military are limited to those contained in the Army Field Manual. The
President extended those same limitations to intelligence agencies this year by execu-
tive order. The President is following his own advice about looking forward by asking
the National Security Council to review what tactics would be appropriate when ter-
rorists are captured who might have information about imminent attacks on Ameri-
cans. The Senate Intelligence Committee is conducting its own review of tactics and is
considering expanding the briefing process for interrogation tactics.
155 CONG. REC. S5305-04 (daily ed. May 11, 2009) (statement of Sen. Alexander).
110. See 155 CONG. REC. S6359-01 (daily ed. June 9, 2009) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse)
("One can hope the Obama administration will be more honorable. I suspect and believe they
will be. But the fact is that a cudgel that so lends itself to abuse will some day again be abused,
and we should find a way to correct that imbalance.").
111. See National Security Nominations, supra note 103. Senator Leahy stated,
We need to get to the bottom of what happened in those eight years-and why-so we
make sure it never happens again. My desire to find a path to reach a reckoning for the
actions of the past eight years has led me to suggest a commission of inquiry. We need
a fair-minded pursuit of what actually happened. Sometimes the best way of moving
forward is getting to the truth, finding out what happened, so we can make sure it does
not happen again.
112. Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 887 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
113. Id. (statement of Sen. Specter, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
114. Senator Whitehouse stated,
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tified only the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee about the enhanced interrogation techniques that
they were using, and those legislators were warned not to tell anyone
in the name of national security. 115 Besides writing letters, those who
were informed could not do anything to show how they disap-
proved.116 To make sure this does not happen again, Senator Patrick
Leahy has argued that we should go forward by creating a nonpartisan
commission.11 7 Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and Senator Russell
Feingold have expressed confidence that the investigations by the
Senate Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, among others, will lead the nation down the right path.118
At the heart of all [the] falsehoods lies a particular and specific problem: The "declas-
sifiers" in the U.S. Government are all in the executive branch. No Senator can declas-
sify, and the procedure for the Senate as an institution to declassify something is so
cumbersome that it has never been used .... The executive branch can use, and has
used, that one-sided advantage to spread assertions that either aren't true at all or may
be technically true but only on a strained, narrow interpretation that is omitted, leaving
a false impression, or that sometimes simply supports one side of an argument that has
two sides-but the other side is one they don't want to face up to and don't declassify.
155 CONG. REC. S6359-01 (daily ed. June 9, 2009) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse).
115. Senator Durbin stated,
I served on the Intelligence Committee of the Senate for four years, and I found myself
constantly in a frustrating position of being told classified information and being
warned not to breathe a word of it to the public at large, for fear that it would endanger
the lives of people who were helping the United States.
And so, there were times when, frankly, I wanted to walk right over to the Senate
Intelligence Committee room and call a press conference and say, if America only
knew.
Hearing on "Torture and the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration" Before the S.
Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Sen.
Durbin), available at 2009 WL 1317264.
116. See id. ("I mean, there were times when, you know, you wanted to express your disap-
proval, and there was no means to do it. If you were privy to the most important information,
there was no means.").
117. See id.
118. Senator Feingold stated,
While the revelations of the past month are uncomfortable for some, they are abso-
lutely essential if our country is to return to the rule of law. I am pleased that the
members of the Judiciary Committee and the Intelligence Committee are moving for-
ward to determine exactly what happened. And I continue to believe that an indepen-
dent commission of inquiry, as Chairman Leahy has proposed, is needed, so we can
fully understand and come to terms with this dark chapter in our recent history.
Id. (statement of Sen. Feingold). Senator Whitehouse stated that the
[t]ime will come when it, frankly, becomes inevitable that a nonpartisan, authoritative
commission should take a look at the work of Senator Feinstein's investigations, the
OPR opinions, what the Judiciary Committee does under the leadership of Chairman
Leahy and other factors, and draw it all together, so that the American people can
make the appropriate conclusions.
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D. Nongovernmental Organization Perspectives
Broad coalitions of advocacy groups have vociferously argued that
it would be improper to move forward without criminal investigation
and prosecution. These groups want to uphold the rule of law, and
they have thus demanded that Bush Administration officials be held
accountable. One such coalition, led by the American Civil Liberties
Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights, has petitioned Attor-
ney General Holder to appoint an independent prosecutor to investi-
gate and prosecute the Bush Administration officials who authorized
and ordered the use of torture. The Center for Constitutional Rights
maintains that a truth commission is not enough.119 It contends that a
full investigation and prosecution is necessary for the Obama Admin-
istration to meaningfully reassert the rule of law, secure justice for
torture victims, and deter future government officials from repeating
this conduct.120
Another coalition, whose website can be found at www.DisbarTor-
tureLawyers.com, is not waiting for Attorney General Holder to hold
Bush Administration lawyers accountable for authorizing torture. In
May 2009, this coalition filed disciplinary complaints with state bar
licensing boards against twelve Bush Administration lawyers for vio-
lating the rules of professional responsibility by authorizing the tor-
ture of detainees.12' Moreover, the coalition sent a letter to House
Judiciary Committee Chairman John Conyers, asking that he initiate
impeachment proceedings against current federal judge and former
OLC official Jay Bybee, who was responsible for some of the most
notorious OLC memos that seemingly authorized torture.1 22
VI. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In formulating the government's response to 9/11, Bush Adminis-
tration officials saw that they could, with the help of a compliant and
Id. (testimony of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Chairman, S. Comm. on Admin. Oversight and the
Courts). Senator Whitehouse also stated,
If American democracy is important, damage to her institutions is important and needs
to be understood. Much of this damage was done to one of America's greatest institu-
tions-the U.S. Department of Justice. I am confident the Judiciary Committee, under
Chairman Leahy's leadership, will assure that we understand and repair that damage
and protect America against it ever happening again.
155 CONG. REC. S6359-01 (daily ed. June 9, 2009) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse).
119. Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Prosecutions and Accountability, http://ccrjustice.org/filesl
CCR._ProsecutionsFactsheet.pdf.
120. Id.
121. See Velvet Revolution, The Disbar Torture Lawyers Campaign, http://www.velvetrevolu-
tion.us/torture-lawyers/index.php.
122. Id.
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politicized OLC, dilute the application of the U.S. standards that pro-
hibit torture. In the aftermath of 9/11, neither the OLC nor key advi-
sors to President Bush gave serious consideration to torture standards
under international law. The policies of waterboarding and other
forms of torture that resulted from this permissive approach to inter-
rogation have now come to light, damaging as never before the repu-
tation of the United States, a country that has heretofore hailed itself
as dedicated to human rights and the rule of law.
The international standards of the CAT help to remind us that tor-
ture violates core American values, and that the rule of law requires
the investigation of those who were responsible for torture, no matter
how politically challenging that prospect may be. This is not "foreign
law" interfering with U.S. law. Quite to the contrary, these interna-
tional standards, at least if given proper consideration by U.S. policy-
makers, could act as a needed "failsafe" in promoting the protection
of the rule of law within the United States.
Unfortunately, in the aftermath of 9/11, the requirements of inter-
national torture norms were dismissed even more easily than those of
our domestic legal order. Although the transition to the Obama Ad-
ministration has led to a vast improvement in torture policy, the
residual consequences of the policies of the past Administration re-
.main grave.
Many detainees who were tortured in the past are still in U.S. cus-
tody today. Their disposition is complicated by fundamental princi-
ples of the CAT. First of all, the CAT obliges the United States to
ensure that any statements extracted by the use of torture may not be
invoked as evidence in any legal proceedings. 123 In practice, this will
make it impossible to try (or at least impossible to try fairly, according
to U.S. and international standards) those who have been tortured. If
these people cannot be tried, what is the U.S. government to do with
them?
The CAT's non-refoulement rule 124 also raises the problem of what
the U.S. government should do with people who are likely to again
face torture if returned to their home countries. Keeping them in the
United States is not an attractive option, but the U.S. government will
123. See CAT, supra note 16, art. 15 ("Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which
is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any
proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was
made.").
124. See CAT, supra note 16, art. 3(1) ("No State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extra-
dite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be
in danger of being subjected to torture.").
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need its NATO allies and others to share the burden of addressing this
problem. This is a difficult matter to sort out now, and it should have
been anticipated when the Bush Administration's interrogation poli-
cies were formulated.
Subsequent administrations should be careful not to compound past
errors by failing to pursue the investigation and possible prosecution
of those who may be responsible for torture. For better or worse, it
seems likely that the erroneous and now-withdrawn OLC opinions
will preclude the prosecution, at least within the United States, of
those who committed acts of torture in reliance upon them. OLC
opinions cannot, however, excuse the United States from its obliga-
tion 125 under the CAT126 to submit cases of alleged torture to compe-
tent national authorities for prosecution.
Attorney General Holder's decision to open a "preliminary review"
into allegations of illegal torture 127 is a good beginning. But a prelimi-
nary review is only a modest step towards accountability for past tor-
ture. Further action by the DOJ will need to follow if the preliminary
review reveals that a full investigation is warranted. Given the infor-
mation that has already been made public about the use of shocking
interrogation techniques, 128 it seems quite likely that a full investiga-
tion will be warranted. In this case, international standards provide a
useful reminder that justice and the rule of law require no less.
125. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for
its failure to perform a treaty.").
126. See CAT, supra note 16, art. 7(1) ("The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdic-
tion a person alleged to have committed any [torture] offence ... is found shall.., if it does not
extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.").
127. See Holder Statement Announcing Preliminary Review, supra note 98.
128. See INSPECrOR GENERAL REVIEW, supra note 1.
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